4. Repeated Interactions and Reputations for Resolve: A Process Tracing Experiment

In the second set of experimental surveys, presented in this chapter, I further assess the effects of key variables on perceptions of an individual leader’s resolve. The previous set of experiments, presented in the last chapter, indicate that, while state-based factors can affect perceptions of leader resolve, a leader’s statements and behavior still significantly impact these perceptions even when controlling for these state-based factors. While the first set of experiments find that leaders can develop reputations for resolve independently of their predecessors and the state, these experiments could not address how individual leaders develop these reputations for resolve over time. Furthermore, while the responses to the open-ended questions in the first set of experiments suggest that participants prioritize information regarding a leader’s statements and behavior in their decision-making, a more thorough analysis is needed to fully understand how participants process leader-specific versus state-based information when making assessments of resolve.

In the second set of experiments, presented in this chapter, I not only consider whether leaders can develop reputations for resolve independently of the state, but also examine the process by which these reputations develop over time. In doing so, I address the following empirical questions regarding the development of leader-specific reputations: 1) What types of information do participants seek out when making assessment of a leader’s resolve? 2) How does this information affect participants’ perceptions of a leader’s resolve? 3) How do these perceptions change over time through repeated interactions? While the first set of experiments observed the ability of leaders to develop reputations for resolve by focusing on periods of
leadership change within a state, this second set of experiments considers how the reputation for resolve of a single leader develops and evolves over time through multiple interactions.

In this set of experiments, I manipulate both the type of information participants have access to as well as the content of this information. Rather than presenting participants with a single crisis that is played out across an original leader and a new successive leader in the same state (as is done in the first set of experiments), this second set of experiments presents participants with a three-stage scenario survey in which they repeatedly interact with a single leader through escalating stakes over a consistent issue under dispute and must make assessments about the opposing leader’s resolve at each stage of the survey. As I will explain more further, this experimental design provides insight into how a leader’s reputation for resolve develops across multiple interactions. More specifically, I directly test several hypotheses presented in Chapter 2 as I randomly assign participants to different treatment groups and manipulate the information they have access to at each stage of the survey based on their assigned group. In doing so, I analyze the effects of leader-specific information (such as a leader’s statements or past actions) versus state-based information (such as information regarding the military capability of a leader’s state or the state’s conflict history) on perceived resolve. Through this iterative survey design, I also test my hypothesis that early interactions will be highly influential to the development of reputations for resolve and remain robust throughout later interactions (H_8).¹

These experiments also complement the previous set of experiments, which strongly indicated that leaders develop reputations for resolve separate from both the state and their predecessors. Results of the first set of experiments presented in Chapter 3 also suggested that a

¹ A full list of the hypotheses derived from my theory of leader-specific reputations as well as from the extant literature discussed in Chapter 2 of the dissertation are presented in Appendix A.
leader’s reputation is based on both a leader’s statements and behavior while in office. These experiments further indicated that state-based factors, including state reputation, communicated interest in the dispute, and relative military capability, may also be influential to perceptions of resolve, but that leader-specific information is still influential on a leader’s reputation even when accounting for these state-based factors. The second set of experiments, presented in this chapter, expands upon these findings and delves further into the precise causal mechanisms and process by which leaders develop individual reputations for resolve. In addition to further testing the effects of leader-specific vs. state-based information, this set of experiments allows for a clearer differentiation of the effects of a leader’s statements vs. behavior on perceptions of resolve.

This second set of experiments employs experimental process tracing methods. Rather than simply varying the information put forth in the scenario (as done in the first experiment), this second experiment allows participants decide which information to access before making a decision, allowing the researcher to track the participant’s decision-making process. The combination of both sets of experiments (presented in this chapter and the last chapter) provides strong insight into how leaders develop reputations for resolve over time and which factors are most salient in the development of these reputations.

4.1 Process Tracing Experiments

Process tracing experiments have been widely used in psychology, neuroscience, and economics to understand how individuals make decisions. In political science, this experimental method has been employed to explore a variety of phenomena ranging from voter choice during campaigns (Redlawsk 2004; Redlawsk, Civettini, and Emmerson 2010; Redlawsk, and Lau 2009) to the dynamics of negotiations (Florea et al 2003) to foreign policy decision-making strategies among both elites and lay populations (Mintz 2004; Mintz et al 1997; Mintz, Redd,
and Vedlitz 2006). While traditional survey experiments reveal the effect of treatments on participants’ decisions, they are insufficient to provide insight into how those decisions are made. With process tracing experiments, in contrast, researchers can identify the process by which participants make decisions. The main advantage of process tracing experiments lies in their ability to reveal which information is accessed by participants and how this information affects a particular decision or assessment (Ford et al. 1989; Jean-Francois et al. 2011; Lafond et al. 2009; Svenson 1979). By allowing participants to determine which information they access and tracking those decisions, computerized process tracing software provides the best method by which to understand the internal dynamics of decision-making (Huber, Huber, and Schulte-Mecklenbeck 2011; Lau and Redlawsk 2001; Mintz 2004; Mintz, Yand, and McDermott 2011).

More specifically, this software allows researchers to look at both the depth and breadth of information search among survey participants, indicating both the style of information search participants use as well as which information was considered most important by participants (Redlawsk 2004).

While there are several types of process tracing software available, my analysis employs the Dynamic Process Tracing Environment (DPTE). The DPTE is particularly useful for studying decision making over time as it “can be used to study multi-stage, multi-alternative evaluation and choice environments” (Redlawsk 2013). The DPTE provides greater flexibility as it allows for multi-stage surveys in which different information can be accessed by the participant at each stage according to the treatment group and condition to which each participant is randomly assigned (Redlawsk, Civettini, and Emerson 2010). Furthermore, I find the interface of the DPTE to be more sophisticated than other platforms and easier for participants to navigate.

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2 I also considered using Mintz’s Decision Board Platform but found the software did not readily provide the flexibility needed to conduct a multi-stage analysis.
The DPTE is particularly advantageous as the researcher maintains complete control over pre-
and post-stage questions, which alternatives are presented at each stage, and how each stage of
the experiment is set up and presented to participants.

4.2 Experimental Procedure

Like the previous set of experiments, all participants who take the survey are given a
consent form explaining the survey procedure and any potential risks or benefits of participating
in the study. All subjects are randomly assigned to a treatment group in which I manipulate the
type of information they can access as well as the content of that information. Participants are
asked to read multiple scenarios and make assessments based on what they read. Unlike the
previous set of experiments, which focused on periods of leadership change, this set of
experiments follows the development of the reputation for resolve of a single leader across
multiple interactions through an iterative survey design. The survey provides participants with
three separate scenarios addressing a consistent issue under dispute: a summit meeting, extended
negotiations, and a potential crisis. This structure and its accompanying scenarios is based on the
pattern of interactions observed in the case study presented in Chapter 6 in which leaders discuss
an issue under dispute with increasingly high stakes negotiations, beginning by establishing their
positions through a formal summit meeting, continuing direct negotiations after the summit, and
culminating in a potential crisis when a negotiated settlement has not been met.\(^3\) Through this
iterative survey design, I track the development of participants’ perceptions of the reputation for
resolve of a single leader over time and examine the impact of independent variables on these

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\(^3\) Chapter 6 follows the development of Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev’s perceptions of the reputation
for resolve of first President Eisenhower and then President Kennedy through a series of repeated
interactions, including the Berlin Crises of 1958 and 1961 and the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962.

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perceptions across various stages of the experiment (Ludwick and Zeller 2001; Kuperman and Ozkececi-Taner 2006).

Prior to reading the first scenario, subjects are given a series of control and demographic questions. These questions are the same as those presented in the previous set of experiments and capture preexisting beliefs regarding the participant’s view of the importance of world leaders and the appropriate use of military force. After reading each scenario, participants answer questions regarding their assessments of the leader’s resolve. The order of action in the survey instrument is as follows: Participant consent form; demographic and control questions; stage 1 scenario prompt (international summit); participant information selection; participant assessments of resolve; stage 2 scenario prompt (negotiations); participant information selection; participant assessments of resolve; stage 3 scenario prompt (crisis); participant information selection; participant assessments of resolve; debriefing. The questions regarding the participants’ assessments of the leader’s resolve are identical across each stage of the survey. For the final stage of the survey, in which participants read a scenario about a crisis with a potential threat, participants are also asked to predict how the opposing leader would respond to a potential threat. By comparing the responses across each stage of the survey of participants who are randomly assigned to different treatments, I analyze the extent to which each participant’s perception of a leader’s resolve changes over time as well as the extent to which assessments of resolve are affected by the information participants choose to access. In between each stage, participants are asked a factual question based on the previous scenario to check for both reading comprehension and attention (Chandler, Mueller, and Paolicci 2013). Those participants who failed to answer both these questions correctly are excluded from the analysis. The survey
concludes with basic demographic questions regarding gender, age, and education as well as a
debriefing. The full text of the experiment can be found in Appendix B.

4.2.1 Deception

This experiment involves two related forms of deception. Like the first set of experiments
presented in the last chapter, I use a monetary incentive to encourage participants to carefully
read the survey and to be more invested in the study (Dickson 2011; Druckman and Kam 2011;
Chandler, Mueller, and Paolicci 2013). Participants are informed that correctly predicting each
leader’s resolve throughout the survey will earn them a bonus payment. As part of the deception,
however, all participants receive this bonus regardless of their answer choices. In addition, as
participants in this study are asked to select which pieces of information to read at each stage of
the survey before making assessments of resolve, participants are told that each piece of
information they access will cost them $0.01. In reality, however, participants are not penalized
for accessing information. This deception is meant to mimic the real world trade-offs between
the desire to make a good/correct assessment and the cost, in terms of time and resources, it takes
to make these decisions. Both deceptions are explained to participants in the debriefing and were
approved by the Institutional Review Board at Duke University.

4.3 Survey Design

4.3.1 Scenario Design

In the three-stage survey, participants are asked to read three successive yet distinct
scenarios in which they take the role of a leader of an unnamed state. Each of the three
scenarios involves an ongoing foreign policy dispute with the same leader from a neighboring
state over who should control an area of resource rich land along the participant’s and

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4 As in the previous set of experiments, I chose not to use real states as to avoid any confounding issues
due to pre-existing beliefs about a particular state.
neighboring state’s shared border. Throughout each scenario, this issue under dispute remains consistent. During the first scenario, participants are told they are about to enter into negotiations with the neighboring state’s leader at an international summit. In the second scenario, participants are informed that they were unable to reach an agreement with the leader of the neighboring state during the summit and are now entering into ongoing negotiations over who should control the area of land. Finally, in the third scenario, participants are informed that a compromise has yet to be reached and that they have the option to issue a threat to try to force a settlement. The scenario text as presented to participants for each of the stages is as follows:

*International Summit:* You are the leader of a state that shares a disputed border with a neighboring state. You are about to enter into negotiations at an international summit with the leader of the neighboring state over who should control this disputed area of land along your shared border. This area of land is rich in mineral resources and whoever controls this land will get both more power and resources. Before you go to this important conference to negotiate with the opposing leader, you need to gather information as to how you think this leader will act during the summit meeting. You have never negotiated with this leader before.

*Extended Negotiations:* Since the summit ended a few months ago, you have decided to enter into on-going negotiations to try to find a solution to the dispute over who should control the disputed area of land. Before you enter into these negotiations you need to predict how the opposing leader will act during these negotiations.

*Potential Crisis:* Despite the continued negotiations over the disputed piece of land, a compromise has not been reached. You are getting impatient to end the dispute. You can issue a threat to send military forces to the border if a settlement is not reached within the next few months. Before you issue a threat, however, you must predict how the opposing leader would respond to the threat.

At each stage of the survey, participants are presented with the appropriate scenario and are then informed that, on the next screen, they will find pieces of information that their advisors have gathered to help the participant predict how the leader in the neighboring (opposing) state may act. Participants are then presented with a screen in which they can access different types of
information. Participants are further told they may access as much or as little information as they like. Figure 21, below, shows a sample screenshot of this part of the survey.

![Figure 21: Sample Screenshot of Information Available to Participants](image)

At each stage of the scenario, participants are presented with randomly ordered relevant information based on the treatment group to which they are assigned that can help them determine how the opposing leader may act during the summit, negotiations, and in the face of an impending threat to send military forces to the border. Participants are free to access as much or as little information as they see fit. Finally, participants are not made aware of which information they will have access to prior to seeing this screen. Participants are not informed of the group to which they are randomly assigned, nor are they told the type of information participants assigned to other groups may access.

After participants finish accessing the information they wish to see, each participant is asked to make assessments about the opposing leader’s resolve. Upon answering these questions, participants are then told how the opposing leader acted during that stage of interactions. Participants are then asked to make predictions regarding they believe how the opposing leader
would behave in a similar situation in the future. For example, after reading the scenario about
the upcoming summit meeting, accessing information about the opposing leader or state, and
answering questions about how they believe the opposing leader will behave during the summit,
participants are told how the opposing leader actual behaved at the summit (i.e. whether the
opposing leader was resolute or irresolute during the summit). Participants are then asked how
they believe the opposing leader would behave in future summit meetings. After answering the
final set of questions at each stage, participants move onto the next stage of the survey. Upon
reading the final scenario and completing the accompanying questions, subjects are asked basic
demographic questions and are then debriefed.

4.3.2 Groups and Conditions

The experiment consists of a series of factorial designed experimental groups in which I
manipulate the type of information participants can access and the content of that information.
Participants are randomly assigned to groups in which they can only access information
regarding the opposing leader’s statements and behavior (leader information only groups) or to
groups in which they can access this information in addition to one type of state-based
information. A full list of treatment and control groups is found in Table 3 on the next page.
The first experimental group is as a 2x2x2 factorial design, and participants were only able to access information about the leader’s statements and behavior at each stage of the scenario. At each stage of the scenario, the leader was either resolute or irresolute in his statements and behavior ($H_1$). In the second set of treatment groups, an 8x3 factorial design, participants could access information regarding the leader’s statements and behavior as well as information regarding the past behavior of the state. For these treatment groups, the state either acted resolutely or irresolutely in the past ($H_2$). For the third set of treatment groups, which is also an 8x3 factorial design, participants could access information regarding the leader’s statements and behavior in addition to information regarding the state’s interest in the dispute, which was either high or low ($H_3$). For the fourth set of treatment groups, an 8x3 factorial design,
participants could access information regarding the regime type of the target state, which is either a democracy or a non-democracy, as well as the leader’s statements and behavior (H_7).

Finally, for the fifth set of treatment groups, an 8x4 factorial design, participants could access information regarding the leader’s statements and behavior as well as the target’s military capability relative to the participant’s. In these treatment groups, participants could access information that the opposing state’s military was either stronger, weaker, or of equal strength to the participants’ military (H_6).

It is important to note that participants assigned to the state-based information treatment groups could only access one type of state-based information. For example, participants could be assigned to a group in which they could access information about state interest in the dispute or in which they could access information about the opposing state’s regime type, but not both. While the leader’s signaled resolve could change at each stage of the survey, the value of the state-based variables remained consistent throughout the survey. For example, a participant could access information that the leader was resolute in the first stage, irresolute in the second stage, and resolute in the third stage. However, if a participant was assigned to the resolute state behavior group, the participant could be able to access information that the state was resolute at each stage of the survey. Despite this static information, participants were not told that the content of the state-based information would change.

4.3.2.1 Stage Information Options

The type of information participants could access at each scenario varied by the stage of the survey and the group to which participants were assigned. For the summit meeting stage of the survey (Stage 1), all participants could access information regarding the opposing leader’s statements prior to the summit and intelligence reports indicating how the opposing leader may
behave during the summit. At the extended negotiations stage (Stage 2), all participants could access information about the opposing leader’s interactions with other leaders during previous negotiations, more information about how the opposing leader acted during the recent summit, and information about the opposing leader’s press statements leading into negotiations. At the crisis stage (Stage 3), all participants could access information regarding the opposing leader’s press statements prior to the crisis, the opposing leader’s behavior in past crisis situations, and the opposing leader’s behavior during the previous rounds of negotiations in the second stage of the survey. At each of these stages, subjects assigned to state-based information groups could also access relevant state-based information depending on the group and condition to which they were assigned. It is important to note that while the content of this information is consistent, the way in which the information is phrased varies by the scenario. In other words, participants could reinforce the treatment by gathering additional information for the state-based treatment to which they were assigned. For example, a participant who was assigned to the high state interest condition and accessed the state interest information at each stage would be told during the summit stage: “In press statements, the opposing leader has stated that the disputed border is a high priority for his state.” During the negotiation stage, the participant would read: “The opposing leader has repeatedly stated that the disputed border is the top priority for his state right now.” Finally during the crisis stage, the participant would be informed: “The disputed area remains a high priority for the opposing state.” The full wording for each condition at each stage of the experiment can be found in Appendix C.

4.3.3 Dependent Variables

Like the previous set of experiments, the main dependent variable in my analysis is the extent to which each leader is viewed by participants to be resolute. To measure resolve, I
employ two common synonyms for resolve used in the literature: toughness and determination. Directly after reading each scenario and accessing information, participants indicate how tough and determined they believe the opposing leader to be:

   How much determination do you the opposing leader will show in response to this threat?
   How tough or weak do you think the opposing leader will be in response to this threat?

For each question, responses were clearly labeled along a five-point ordinal scale (Krosnick 1999; Pelham and Blanton 2007; Sue and Ritter 2012). For example, subjects could indicate the leader was “very tough, tough, neither tough nor weak, weak, or very weak.” I average these two measures to create a composite measure of resolve. In addition, participants are asked how likely they believe a compromise will be reached in the upcoming summit or negotiations. Finally, during the crisis stage, participants were also asked how they believed the opposing leader would respond to the potential threat as well as how confident they were in this belief and whether or not they would actually issue the threat.

During the summit and negotiation stages, participants are asked how likely they believe the leader is to be tough and determined during the upcoming negotiations as well as how likely they believe a compromise will be reached during the summit or negotiations. During the crisis stage, participants are asked how tough and determined they believe the opposing leader will be in response to the threat as well as how they believe the leader would respond to the potential threat, how confident they are in their beliefs, and whether or not they would issue the threat. Finally, after being told how the leader acted at each stage of the survey, participants were then asked how tough and determined they believed the leader would act in future similar situations.
4.3.4 Control Questions

Before reading the first scenario, participants answer a series of demographic and control questions that are identical to those used in the first set of experiments presented in the previous chapter. Demographic questions include participants’ political leanings, party affiliation, interest in and attention to international events, and their primary news source. As the survey asks participants to make assessments and predictions about international leaders and their responses to military threats, the control questions measure the extent to which subjects believe international leaders are efficacious actors in international politics as well as participants’ views regarding the acceptability of the use of military force. To measure participants’ views on the importance of leaders to international politics, participants are asked, on a five-point scale, how strongly they agree or disagree with the following statements:

- International leaders are important and have a large impact on international events.
- It doesn’t really matter who is in office. A country would end up with the same policies regardless of the person in office.

To account for participants’ views on the acceptability of the use of militarized force, subjects are asked how strongly they agree or disagree with the following statements:

- Sometimes the only way to solve a problem between states is through military force.
- The use of military force only makes problems worse.
- States should be able to talk things out and reach a peaceful solution to their problems.

To avoid issues with priming effects by asking participants about leaders prior to taking the survey, these control questions were randomly ordered and interspersed with the initial demographic questions. I also ensured that participants would not receive a question regarding their views of leaders as the last question before reading the first scenario. Finally, at the end of
the survey, participants were asked additional demographic data including their age, gender, and education level.

4.3.5 Participant Selection

This set of experiments was administered through the Amazon Mechanical Turk (AMT) subject recruitment platform. Experimental participants received a total of $0.75 for participating in the 10-15 minute survey. Participants from the subject pool self-selected into the survey and were randomly assigned to a treatment group and condition. Like the previous set of experiments, the sample was limited to U.S. residents and AMT workers with a 95% or higher approval rating (Berinksy, Huber, and Lenz 2012; Chandler, Mueller, and Paolicci 2013; Rand 2012). As this set of surveys was completed after those presented in the previous chapter, subjects who participated in the first set of experiments were not eligible for this study. This exclusion was due to the similar content and set-up of the two surveys and the concern that participating in the first set of experiments could both bias subjects’ thinking and answers in the second set of experiments, particularly as both surveys use the same measurements for resolve and involve the same deception.

The final sample (N=3,198)\(^5\) was 49.09% female and 50.91% male. Participants were well educated as 48.35% of the sample held a bachelor’s degree or higher and an additional 41.26% had completed some college. As such, almost 90% of the sample had at least some college education. Participant ages ranged from 18 to 75 (median = 30.89). These demographics are comparable to those of the previous set of experiments. The sample for the second set of experiments was slightly less conservative than the previous sample with 55.44% of participants

\(^5\) Over the course of the survey, participants answered two factual questions based on the information in the various scenarios. Participants who failed to correctly both these questions correctly were dropped from the analysis and are not included in this total.
identifying as some form of liberal in political leaning and 39.21% identifying as Democrats. In contrast, only 19.95% of the sample considered themselves some form of conservative and 14.48% identified as members of the Republican Party. Finally, the sample for this set of experiments was quite interested in international affairs with 53.61% indicating they were either somewhat or extremely interested in international politics and 42.00% indicating they either somewhat or very closely follow international events. In comparison to the sample from the first set of experiments, this sample is less conservative, composed of more moderates and independents, and slightly less interested in international politics.

4.4 Information Selection

For the first step in the analysis, I examine which information participants seek out at each stage of the survey. In doing so, I determine whether participants were more likely to access multiple pieces of information at different stages of the survey, the extent to which participants relied on a leader’s actions vs. previous behavior in making decisions, how strongly participants focused on leader-based vs. state-based information in their assessments, and which information participants selected first during each stage. These analyses provide insight into the thoroughness of each participant’s information search and their reliance on a particular heuristic when accessing this information.

4.4.1 Thoroughness of Information Search

Table 4, on the next page, shows the percentage of participants accessing one, two, three, or four or more pieces of information at each stage of the survey. The results indicate that, in general, participants seek out quite a bit of information when making their decisions. This

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6 In recruiting participants from the AMT sample, the survey was advertised as being about political events to purposely try to gain a sample which would be both more interested and attentive to international politics.
suggests that participants take the survey seriously and conduct a deliberate and thorough
information search.\footnote{This could be due to the fact that participants used a more rational decision-making style than predicted or it could be related to the amount of time participants had to access this information. Due to limitations in the program, participants could not simply proceed to the next screen when they were done with their information search. Rather they were required to spend a full minute on this screen before proceeding to the next screen.}

### Table 4: Amount of Information Accessed by Participants

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Summit Stage (Stage 1)</th>
<th>Negotiation Stage (Stage 2)</th>
<th>Crisis Stage (Stage 3)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>All Groups</td>
<td>Leader Info Only</td>
<td>State Info Also</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>None</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4.32%</td>
<td>3.48%</td>
<td>4.46%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>One</td>
<td>15.51%</td>
<td>12.83%</td>
<td>5.96%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Two</td>
<td>24.80%</td>
<td>52.39%</td>
<td>20.16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Three</td>
<td>37.77%</td>
<td>16.74%</td>
<td>41.31%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Four or More</td>
<td>17.61%</td>
<td>14.56%</td>
<td>18.12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean # info chosen</td>
<td>2.55</td>
<td>2.31</td>
<td>2.59</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Participants assigned to the leader information only groups were presented two pieces of
accessible information at the summit stage and three pieces of accessible information at the
negotiation and crisis stages. Participants assigned to the state-based information groups were
presented with three pieces of accessible information at the summit stage and four at the
negotiation and crisis stages. Accordingly, the number of pieces of information accessed at each
stage according to the assigned group indicates that most participants chose to access as much or
almost as much information as was available to them. Furthermore, a fair number of participants
in each group chose to access the same piece of information more than once, such as leader-

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information only group assigned participants who accessed three or more pieces of information at the summit stage and four or more pieces of information at the negotiation and crisis stages. In contrast, relatively few participants chose to access no information at each stage. Only 96 participants (0.03% of the total sample) chose not to access any information at all throughout the survey.

The results presented in Table 4 also illuminate participants’ information gathering processes. According to my hypothesis that early interactions should matter most for reputations for resolve (H$_8$), I would expect participants to gather the most information during the first stage of interactions (the summit stage) and less information as the survey progresses. The results provide general support for this hypothesis. Overall, participants did gather the most information during the summit stage (total sample mean = 2.55). Furthermore, this stage saw the fewest participants failing to collect any information with less than 5% of the total sample selecting no information. In contrast, participants selected fewer pieces of information during the negotiation stage, regardless of the type of information they could access (total sample mean = 2.09), and a greater number of participants in the sample failed to access any information (12.68% of the total sample). The final stage of the survey, the crisis stage, saw a comparable amount of information being accessed as in the negotiation stage (total sample mean = 2.13), with a similar percentage of participants failing to access any information (13.48% of the total sample). These results indicate that participants seek out more information during their first interaction with a new leader and then access less information for their second and third interactions. Furthermore, these results become even more meaningful when we consider that participants in both the leader-specific and state-based information groups had more information options during the negotiation and crisis stages than they had during the summit stage.
4.4.2 Which Information Do Participants Seek Out

Next, I examine which specific information participants seek out at each stage of the survey. For the purpose of comparability, I divide this analysis into an examination of the leader-based information all participants had access to and the information participants assigned to state-based information groups seek out. Table 5, below, shows the percentage of participants from leader-based information and state-based information groups accessing particular leader-based information at each stage.

Table 5: Percentage of Participants Accessing Leader-Based Information

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Intelligence Reports</th>
<th>Summit Stage (Stage 1)</th>
<th>Negotiation Stage (Stage 2)</th>
<th>Crisis Stage (Stage 3)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>All Groups</td>
<td>Leader-Info</td>
<td>State-Info</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intelligence Reports</td>
<td></td>
<td>Only</td>
<td>Also</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leader Statements</td>
<td>85.33%</td>
<td>92.61%</td>
<td>84.11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Past Leader Behavior</td>
<td>77.30%</td>
<td>86.96%</td>
<td>75.68%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leader Behavior in Last Stage</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The results of this table indicate key trends in the selection of leader-based data across all groups. First, it is important to note the large number of participants assigned to the state-based information groups that chose seek out leader-specific information. In these instances, participants had access to both state-based and leader-specific information when making assessments of resolve. If reputations are based primarily on state-based factors, as current theories of reputation for resolve predict, one would expect participants in the state-based
information groups to heavily view state-based information and access little leader-specific information. The high percentages of participants assigned to these groups that access leader-based information at each stage, particularly intelligence reports on the new leader (84.11%) and statements by the leader prior to summit negotiations (75.68%) as well as the leader’s behavior in past crises (72.79%), indicates that these participants do view leader-specific information even when they have access to state-based information. Furthermore, in many instances, participants assigned to state-based information groups accessed leader-specific information at percentages comparable to those participants assigned to the leader-information only group. This is particularly prevalent across all leader-specific information options at the negotiation stage as well as for a leader’s statements and past behavior during the crisis stage of the survey.

Second, these results indicate that, when available, subjects are more likely to access information regarding a leader’s past behavior in similar situations than the leader’s statements. This is evident at both the negotiation and crisis stages. For subjects assigned to leader-only information groups and subjects assigned to state-based information groups, participants accessed information regarding a leader’s past behavior at much higher rates than a leader’s statements to the press. At the negotiation stage, 62.54% of the total sample accessed information about a leader’s past behavior while only 52.19% of the total sample sought out information about the leader’s statements going into negotiations. The difference at the crisis stage is even more notable as only 47.50% of the total sample accessed information about a leader’s statements going into the crisis but 73.70% of the total sample sought out information about the leader’s behavior in past crises. Furthermore, it appears that what is most important to participants regarding a leader’s behavior is how that leader acted in similar situations. While 54.50% of the total sample sought out more information at the negotiation stage about how the leader had
handled negotiations during the summit, only 39.93% of the total sample at the crisis stage wanted more information about how the leader had handled negotiations during the previous stage. These rates are also much lower than the rates of participants seeking out information as to how the leader had handled similar situations in the past. Thus, it appears that a leader’s past behavior weighs heavily on participants’ information search decisions.

For the second part of this analysis, I consider the extent to which participants assigned to the state-based information conditions seek out state-based information at each stage of the survey. The percentages of participants assigned to these groups accessing their respective state-based information at each stage of the survey are presented in Table 6 below.

**Table 6: Percentage of Eligible Participants Accessing State-Based Information**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Summit Stage (Stage 1)</th>
<th>Negotiation Stage (Stage 2)</th>
<th>Crisis Stage (Stage 3)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Past State Behavior in Similar Situations</td>
<td>76.69%</td>
<td>38.84%</td>
<td>59.18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State Interest</td>
<td>72.50%</td>
<td>50.97%</td>
<td>35.63%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State Regime Type</td>
<td>73.10%</td>
<td>36.73%</td>
<td>30.06%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relative Military Capability</td>
<td>72.42%</td>
<td>27.83%</td>
<td>34.51%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These results indicate that participants are most likely to access state-based information during the summit stage, the stage in which participants sought out the most information in general. Interestingly, participants from the state-based information groups seek out state-based information during this first stage at comparable rates to the leader’s statements regarding the upcoming summit but at lower rates than intelligence reports about the leader’s potential behavior at the summit. The number of participants accessing state-based information during the negotiation stage then sharply drops-off. While this could be due to the fact that there is little change in the content of information presented in the state-based information groups at the
various stages (although participants are unaware of this), it may be particularly telling that participants assigned to these state-based information groups continue to access leader-specific information at higher rates than they access state-based information.

The table above also reveals interesting trends in the information participants seek out, which appears to be highly dependent on the type of state-based information they could receive. While participants in the regime type and state interest group accessed less state-based information as the survey progressed, participants in the military capability and past state behavior groups sought out more state-based information in the crisis stage than during the negotiation stage. This may suggest that these participants viewed the state’s previous crisis behavior or the relative military capability of the opposing state as more salient during the crisis stage than during negotiations. It is important to note that across both the negotiation and crisis stages participants accessed their respective state-based information at much lower rates than they accessed information regarding the opposing leader’s past behavior in similar situations.

4.4.3 Priority of Information

Finally, I also consider which information participants access first at each stage of the survey. Examining which information participants seek out first provides clues as to which heuristic participants rely on (i.e. leader-specific vs. state-based information) and is also critical to understanding which information participants consider to be most important in the decision task as this information should be accessed first (Lau and Redlawsk 2001). Below I present three distinct tables – one for each stage of the survey – showing the number of participants (in percentages) accessing different types of information first during each stage. I begin by examining the priority of information search among participants in the summit stage as presented in Table 7 on the next page.
Table 7: First Piece of Information Accessed During Summit Stage

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Summit Stage (Stage 1)</th>
<th>Leader-Info Only Group</th>
<th>Past State Behavior Group</th>
<th>State Interest Group</th>
<th>Regime Type Group</th>
<th>Military Strength Group</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Intelligence Reports on Leader’s Potential Actions</strong></td>
<td>66.45%</td>
<td>43.38%</td>
<td>51.18%</td>
<td>47.48%</td>
<td>51.58%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Leader Statements</strong></td>
<td>33.56%</td>
<td>24.41%</td>
<td>24.73%</td>
<td>30.82%</td>
<td>27.57%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Relevant State-Based Information</strong></td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>32.20%</td>
<td>24.10%</td>
<td>21.70%</td>
<td>20.85%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The table above indicates a clear pattern regarding which information participants chose to access first. It is important to keep in mind when analyzing this data that the order in which information was presented to participants was randomized at each stage. Across all groups, including each state-based information group, participants overwhelmingly choose to first access intelligence reports regarding the opposing leader’s potential actions during the upcoming summit. The importance of other state-based and leader-specific information then varies based upon the type of state-based information participants could access. Participants in the past state behavior group are more likely to access information about the opposing state’s actions in previous summits first than they were to seek out the opposing leader’s statements first. In contrast, participants in the regime type and military strength group are more likely to prioritize the opposing leader’s statements over their state-based information. Finally, participants in the state interest group are equally likely to seek out information about the state’s interest in the dispute first as they were to access information about the leader’s statements to the press regarding the upcoming summit. Table 8, on the next page, reveals further interesting patterns in participants’ information choices during the negation stage of the survey.
Table 8: First Piece of Information Accessed During Negotiation Stage

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Negotiation Stage (Stage 2)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Leader-Info Only Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leader Statements</td>
<td>27.30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Past Leader Behavior in Similar Situations</td>
<td>38.01%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More Info on Leader Behavior in Previous Stage</td>
<td>34.70%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relevant State-Based Information</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The table above indicates that participants, regardless of the group to which they are assigned, are most likely to prioritize information regarding the opposing leader’s behavior during previous negotiations. Participants, regardless of whether they could access state-based information, are also more likely to seek out the opposing leader’s statements about the upcoming summit. Finally, with the exception of subjects in the state interest group, participants were more likely to first seek out information regarding how the opposing leader behaved during the previous stage than they are to seek out state-based information. While this could be due to the fact that the content of the state-based information does not change over time, participants are also unaware of the static nature of this state-based information. Accordingly, these findings suggest that during the negotiation stage, participants view leader-specific information as highly salient, with the leader’s past behavior in similar situations being the paramount concern. Table 9, on the next page, indicates additional interesting patterns of information processing during the final stage of the survey.
Table 9: First Piece of Information Accessed During Crisis Stage

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Crisis Stage (Stage 3)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Leader-Info Only Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leader Statements</td>
<td>23.75%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Past Leader Behavior in Similar Situations</td>
<td>63.50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More Info on Leader Behavior in Last Stage</td>
<td>12.75%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relevant State-Based Information</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These results echo the primary results from the analysis of participants’ priority of information search during the negotiation stage as participants during the crisis stage of the survey, regardless of the group to which they are assigned, are most likely to first access information regarding the opposing leader’s behavior during previous crises. While participants in the leader information only group are then most likely to seek out information regarding the opposing leader’s press statements first, the second most prevalent type of information sought out first by participants who could access state-based information varies by group. While participants in the state interest and regime type groups are also then most likely to seek out information reading the opposing leader’s press statements, participants assigned to the past state behavior and relative military strength groups access their relevant state-based information as the second most prevalent type of information processed. This confirms the results from the previous information choice analysis that a state’s past behavior and relative military strength are viewed as more salient by participants during crisis with the potential for military action than during negotiations. However, the primary result from this analysis indicates that participants are most likely to
access information regarding a leader’s past actions regardless of the type of interaction. Even
during crisis situations, participants remain most likely to access information about the opposing
leader’s previous behavior.

4.5 Results and Discussion

The frequency tables above indicate the majority of participants, regardless of the group
to which they are assigned, chose to seek out information about a leader’s statements and
behavior at each stage of the survey. Even those participants who could access information about
state-based factors still heavily relied on leader-specific information when making assessments
of resolve. Furthermore, participants overwhelmingly prioritized information about a leader’s
past actions in their information search, regardless of the group to which they were assigned.
Even participants assigned to state-based information groups were more likely to first choose to
access leader-specific information over state-based information at each stage of the survey. This
suggests that leader-specific factors, such as a leader’s statements and behavior, are important to
participants’ decision-making processes. During the second and third stages of the survey,
participants were most likely to choose to access information regarding a leader’s previous
behavior in similar situations and were more likely to access this information first. This indicates
that participants consider a leader’s past actions to be highly salient. In other words, a leader’s
reputation is important in the decision-making calculus of the participants in the sample.

The next step of the analysis considers the effect of this information on participants’
perceptions of the opposing leader’s resolve. I begin by examining the effect of specific pieces of
information on perceptions of resolve at each stage of the survey. I then consider how the order
of information choice affects perceptions of resolve and the extent to which information accessed
during earlier stages of the survey and early perceptions of resolve affect participants’ later perceptions. Finally, I test for additional influences on perceptions of resolve among participants.

4.5.1 Information Choice and Perceptions of Resolve

For the first step in the analysis, I focus on the effect of information choice on participants’ perceptions of resolve. In doing so, I examine the extent to which participants receiving divergent information about a leader’s statements and behavior, state interest, state history, regime type, or relative military capability affect perceptions of resolve. Participants only receive a given treatment if they access that treatment’s relevant information at each stage. For example, a participant could be assigned to a group in which the state has a history of resolute behavior, but if that participant never accesses information pertaining to previous state behavior, she will never receive the treatment. Accordingly, I only compare the responses across treatment groups and conditions of those individuals who accessed a particular piece of information. In doing so, I am able to determine the treatment effect of each piece of accessed information on participants’ perceptions of resolve at each stage of the survey, independent of other information participants may have accessed.

4.5.1.1 Leader-Specific Information

I first examine the effect of leader-specific information on perceptions of leader resolve, including intelligence reports about the leader, the leader’s statements to the press, and the leader’s previous behavior in similar situations. Every participant in the survey could access leader-specific information at each stage, and each piece of leader-specific information indicated the leader was either resolute or irresolute in their statements or actions. I first test for the effect of different leader-specific information on perceptions of resolve among those participants who
I find consistent evidence that both a leader’s statements and behavior significantly impact participants’ perceived level of leader resolve as indicated in Table 10 below.

### Table 10: Differences in Perceived Resolve among Participants Only Accessing Leader-Based Information

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Information Choice</th>
<th>Resolute</th>
<th>Irresolute</th>
<th>$F$</th>
<th>n</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mean (sd)</td>
<td>Mean (sd)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Summit Stage</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intelligence Reports</td>
<td>4.744 (0.412)</td>
<td>2.152 (0.692)</td>
<td>4532.72***</td>
<td>895</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leader Statements</td>
<td>4.700 (0.449)</td>
<td>2.241 (0.803)</td>
<td>2739.57***</td>
<td>778</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negotiation Stage</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leader Statements</td>
<td>4.072 (0.866)</td>
<td>2.347 (0.921)</td>
<td>876.65***</td>
<td>945</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Past Leader Behavior in Similar Situations</td>
<td>4.101 (0.953)</td>
<td>2.348 (1.010)</td>
<td>941.67***</td>
<td>1201</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crisis Stage</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leader Statements</td>
<td>4.286 (0.645)</td>
<td>2.365 (0.881)</td>
<td>1077.63***</td>
<td>707</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Past Leader Behavior in Similar Situations</td>
<td>4.310 (0.639)</td>
<td>2.202 (0.790)</td>
<td>2843.60***</td>
<td>1353</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

***$p < 0.001$; **$p < 0.01$; *$p < 0.05$; Mean values are ranked on a scale from 5 (very resolute) to 1 (very irresolute)

The above table compares the mean value of the perceived level of resolve across participants who accessed specific pieces of information regarding the leader’s statements and behavior. According to my primary hypothesis, at each stage of the survey participants who accessed leader-specific information indicating the leader may be resolute should perceive the

---

8 ANOVA (one-way variance) methods examine the variance (i.e. means) between two independent samples and reveal the statistical effects of treatments on participants’ decisions.
leader as significantly more resolute than participants who accessed information that indicated the leader may be irresolute. As the table shows, leader-specific information does have a significant effect on perceptions of resolve. Across all three stages, a leader’s statements regarding future behavior had a significant impact on participants’ perceptions of resolve. Participants who accessed information that the leader had put forth statements indicating they would stand firm during the summit, negotiations, and/or crisis were more likely to view that leader as tough and determined at each stage than were participants who received information that the leader had put forth statements indicating a desire for a settlement. A leader’s past behavior in similar situations also had a significant effect on perceptions of resolve. Those leaders who stood firm in past negotiations or crises were more likely to be perceived as resolute during the current negotiations and crisis in the survey. Finally, participants who accessed intelligence reports that the leader was committed to firmly presenting their position at the summit were more likely to perceive the leader as more tough and determined than participants who accessed intelligence reports that the leader may be indecisive.

I next conducted an additional test regarding the effect of leader-specific information on perceptions of resolve by examining the responses of those participants who were assigned to a state-based information group and accessed both state-based and leader-based information at each stage. In doing so, I test for the effect of leader-specific information even when controlling for state-based information. As the results of Table 11 on the next page show, I find that leader-specific information has a significant effect on perceptions of resolve even when directly controlling for the effect of participants accessing state-based information during the survey.
Table 11: Differences in Perceived Resolve among Participants Accessing Leader-Based and State-Based Information

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Information Choice</th>
<th>Resolute</th>
<th>Irresolute</th>
<th>F</th>
<th>n</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>Mean</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(sd)</td>
<td>(sd)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Summit Stage</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intelligence Reports</td>
<td>4.538</td>
<td>2.363</td>
<td>3765.26***</td>
<td>1834</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.640)</td>
<td>(0.864)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leader Statements</td>
<td>4.535</td>
<td>2.364</td>
<td>3425.79***</td>
<td>1694</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.650)</td>
<td>(0.862)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Negotiation Stage</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leader Statements</td>
<td>3.819</td>
<td>2.628</td>
<td>228.09***</td>
<td>724</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.051)</td>
<td>(1.071)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Past Leader Behavior in Similar Situations</td>
<td>3.869</td>
<td>2.590</td>
<td>289.65***</td>
<td>799</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.020)</td>
<td>(1.011)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Crisis Stage</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leader Statements</td>
<td>4.088</td>
<td>2.573</td>
<td>546.26***</td>
<td>812</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.844)</td>
<td>(0.994)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Past Leader Behavior in Similar Situations</td>
<td>4.111</td>
<td>2.528</td>
<td>820.80***</td>
<td>1004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.794)</td>
<td>(0.952)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

***p < 0.001; **p < 0.01; *p < 0.05

As the table above shows, accessing leader-specific information continued to have a significant effect on participants’ perceptions of leader resolve even when directly controlling for state-based information. For example, among this subset of the sample, participants who accessed information that the leader made statements indicating they would stand firm at each stage were significantly more likely to perceive the leader as resolute than subjects who received information that the leader had made statements indicating they wanted a settlement, regardless of the state-based information which these participants also accessed. The same pattern holds true for participants who accessed information regarding either a leader’s past behavior or intelligence reports about the leader. Across all leader-specific information groups, participants
who received cues that the leader would stand firm, based on either the leader’s statements or behavior, were significantly more likely to perceive the leader as more tough and determined than participants who received information that the leader was indecisive or would prefer a settlement, independent of the state-based information which they also accessed.

As a further robustness check, I test for the effect of leader-specific information at each stage of the survey by comparing the responses of participants who accessed a particular piece of information to those who did not access this information. The results indicate that leader-specific information has a significant impact in the hypothesized direction on participants’ perceptions of leader resolve. Participants accessing information that the leader made resolute statements at the summit stage ($F=122.41; p=0.000$), negotiation stage ($F=12.06; p=0.0005$), and crisis stage ($F=16.15; p=0.0001$) were significantly more likely to perceive the leader as resolute, regardless of the other information they accessed. Conversely, participants accessing information that the leader made irresolute statements at the summit stage ($F=75.25; p=0.000$), negotiation stage ($F=76.82; p=0.000$), and crisis stage ($F=23.03; p=0.000$) were significantly less likely to perceive the leader as resolute. Participants accessing intelligence reports that the leader may respond firmly were more likely to perceive the leader as resolute ($F=122.41; p=0.000$), while participants receiving intelligence information that the leader may back down were more likely to perceive the leader as irresolute ($F=242.44; p=0.000$). Finally, accessing information regarding the leader’s past behavior in similar situations also had a significant effect on perceptions of resolve. When comparing the responses of participants who accessed this information at the negotiation and crisis stages to those who did not, participants who received information that the leader stood firm in the past were more likely to view the opposing leader as resolute at both the negotiation ($F=41.37; p=0.000$) and crisis ($F=107.62; p=0.000$) stages,
regardless of the other information they accessed. Conversely, participants accessing information that the leader backed down in the past were more likely to view the opposing leader as irresolute at both the negotiation (F=152.25; p=0.000) and crisis (F=391.98; p=0.000) stages. The results of these and the previous tests provide strong support for the hypothesis that perceptions of a leader’s resolve are based on that leader’s statements and behavior. The effect of leader specific information remains robust even when controlling for state-based information accessed by participants. These findings strongly show that leaders can develop reputations for resolve separate from the state. Furthermore, I find that both a leader’s statements and behavior significantly affect perceptions of resolve. It is not just the actions of leader that are important in signaling resolve, but also the words leaders choose to employ to communicate their resolve. Accordingly, I find that leader-specific reputations for resolve are rooted in both the statements and behavior of individual leaders.

4.5.1.2 State-Based Information

While these results show that a leader’s statements and behavior have a significant impact on perceptions of resolve, state-based variables may also affect these perceptions. To test for the effects of state-based variables on perceptions of resolve, I performed additional ANOVA tests comparing the responses of participants who accessed state-based information. For each state-based information group, I first examine the responses of those who only accessed relevant state-based information at each stage to establish the isolated effect of this information on perceptions of resolve. I then test for the effects of state-based information on perceptions of resolve among those participants who also chose to access leader-specific information. In doing so, I observe the conditioning effect of leader-specific information on perceptions of resolve in
this context. The results of these tests indicate that, while some state-based characteristics have a significant impact on perceptions of resolve, others do not. Furthermore, even when controlling for state-based information, I find that a leader’s statements and behavior still have a significant impact on perceptions of resolve. I present the results for participants assigned to different types of state-based information separately based upon the type of state-based information participants accessed, beginning with participants who only accessed information regarding state history in Table 12 below.

### Table 12: Differences in Perceived Resolve among Participants Only Accessing State History Information

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State History</th>
<th>Resolute</th>
<th>Irresolute</th>
<th>F</th>
<th>n</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>Mean</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(sd)</td>
<td>(sd)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Summit Stage</td>
<td>4.417</td>
<td>2.034</td>
<td>102.80***</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.862)</td>
<td>(0.731)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negotiation Stage</td>
<td>4.000</td>
<td>2.432</td>
<td>26.03***</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.144)</td>
<td>(0.877)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crisis Stage</td>
<td>4.442</td>
<td>2.026</td>
<td>198.67***</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.647)</td>
<td>(0.896)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

***p < 0.001; **p < 0.01; *p < 0.05

As Table 12 indicates, previous state history has a significant impact on perceptions of resolve. At each stage in the survey, participants who only accessed information that the state had previously stood firm in a similar situation were more likely to view the leader as more tough and determined than participants who accessed information that the state had backed down in the past. These results indicate that a state’s past behavior can affect perceptions of leader resolve. I next test for the effects of state history on perceptions of resolve when controlling for the effect of accessing leader-specific information at each stage of the survey, as presented in Table 13 on the next page.

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9 This is the same method of comparison that was utilized in the previous chapter.

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Table 13: Differences in Perceived Resolve among Participants Accessing State History and Leader-Based Information

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State History</th>
<th>Resolute</th>
<th>Irresolute</th>
<th>F</th>
<th>n</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mean (sd)</td>
<td>Mean (sd)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Summit Stage</td>
<td>3.782</td>
<td>2.743</td>
<td>90.11***</td>
<td>496</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.212)</td>
<td>(1.224)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negotiation Stage</td>
<td>3.252</td>
<td>2.758</td>
<td>8.85**</td>
<td>231</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.254)</td>
<td>(1.253)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crisis Stage</td>
<td>3.639</td>
<td>3.021</td>
<td>24.55***</td>
<td>337</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.131)</td>
<td>(1.155)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

***p < 0.001; **p < 0.01; *p < 0.05

As the table above indicates, information regarding state history remains statistically significant even when controlling for leader-specific information. Once again, participants who accessed information that the state had acted firmly in a similar situation in the past viewed the opposing leader as more resolute than participants who accessed information that the state had backed down in the past, regardless of the content of the leader-specific information they accessed. As an additional robustness check, I tested for the effects of previous state behavior at each stage by comparing the responses of those who chose to access this state-based information versus those who could access this information but chose not to. In doing so, I more clearly isolate the effects of accessing this information on perceptions of resolve. The results of these tests largely confirm the findings presented above. Most notably, participants who accessed information that the state stood firm in past summits (F=7.59; p=0.006) and crisis (F=7.08; p=0.008) were more likely to view the leader as more tough and determined than participants who chose not to access this information. However, there was no significant effect of a state standing firm during past negotiations on the leader’s perceived resolve during negotiations (F=0.55; p=0.458) compared to those participants who were eligible but did not access this
information. Conversely, participants who accessed information that the state backed down in past summits (F=8.52; p=0.004), negotiations (F=10.10; p=0.002), and crises (F=8.47; p=0.004) were more likely to view the opposing leader as irresolute. All together, the results of these tests indicate that state history can be a significant factor on perceptions of a leader’s resolve.

I next test for the effect of state interest on perceptions of leader resolve. Like the state history group comparisons, I first examine the effect of this information on participants who chose to only examine information pertaining to state interest (as presented in Table 14 below) and then test for the effect of this state-based information on those participants who also accessed leader-specific information (as presented in Table 15 on the next page).

**Table 14: Differences in Perceived Resolve among Participants Only Accessing State Interest Information**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State Interest</th>
<th>High</th>
<th>Low</th>
<th>F</th>
<th>n</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Summit Stage</td>
<td>Mean (sd)</td>
<td>Mean (sd)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4.500 (0.500)</td>
<td>3.214 (0.848)</td>
<td>10.00**</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negotiation Stage</td>
<td>4.250 (0.950)</td>
<td>2.692 (1.258)</td>
<td>28.86***</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crisis Stage</td>
<td>4.083 (0.585)</td>
<td>2.700 (0.837)</td>
<td>10.42*</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

***p < 0.001; **p < 0.01; *p < 0.05

The results from the table above indicate that, among those participants who only accessed information pertaining to state interest at each stage, state interest does have a significant effect on perceptions of resolve. Those participants who accessed information indicating the dispute was a higher priority viewed the opposing leader as more tough and determined than those participants who accessed information indicating the dispute was a low priority for the opposing state. It is interesting to note, however, that for the summit stage and crisis stage very few participants chose to only access information pertaining to state interest,
confirming the earlier finding that information pertaining to state interest was not a high priority for most participants. Next, I tested for the effects of state interest on perceptions of resolve when controlling for the effect of accessing leader-specific information at each stage of the survey, as presented in Table 15 below.

Table 15: Differences in Perceived Resolve among Participants Accessing State Interest and Leader-Based Information

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State Interest</th>
<th>High</th>
<th>Low</th>
<th>F</th>
<th>n</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mean (sd)</td>
<td>Mean (sd)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Summit Stage</td>
<td>3.624 (1.222)</td>
<td>3.144 (1.314)</td>
<td>16.66**</td>
<td>465</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negotiation Stage</td>
<td>3.460 (1.161)</td>
<td>3.087 (1.208)</td>
<td>6.97**</td>
<td>282</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crisis Stage</td>
<td>3.500 (1.182)</td>
<td>3.171 (1.156)</td>
<td>4.47*</td>
<td>227</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

***p < 0.001; **p < 0.01; *p < 0.05

Participants included in this test accessed information pertaining to state interest as well as some type of leader-specific information at each stage. The results indicate that state interest remains a significant influence to perceptions of leader resolve even when controlling for leader-specific information. Once again participants who accessed information indicating the dispute was a high priority for the opposing state perceived the opposing leader as more tough and determined than those participants who were informed that the dispute was a low priority for the opposing state. Finally, I once again tested for the effects of accessing state interest by comparing the responses of those participants who accessed this information to those who were eligible to access this information but chose not to. In this test, the perceptions of those who chose not to access the information acts as a control group to test the baseline effects of state interest. When comparing the responses of those participants who accessed information that the state was highly interested in the dispute to those who could access this information but chose
not to, I find that high state interest only has a significant effect in the predicted direction on perceptions of resolve at the negotiation stage (F=6.01; p=0.015) and has no significant effect at either the summit stage (F=0.07; p=0.789) or crisis stage (F=0.30; p=0.581). Conversely, using the same method, I find that low state interest has a significantly negative effect on perceptions of resolve at the summit (F=3.86; p=0.051) and negotiation (F=3.08; p=0.080) stages, but not at the crisis stage (F=0.00; p=0.952). Accordingly, these results suggest that state interest does affect perceptions of resolve, but that low state interest has a more consistent effect on these perceptions.

The results from these first two sets of tests indicate that state-based information can affect perceptions of leader resolve. I next examine the effect of the opposing state’s regime type on these perceptions, both among participants who only accessed information regarding regime type at each individual stage (presented in Table 16 below) and for participants who access regime type information and leader-based information (presented in Table 17 on the next page). The results of these two tests, however, indicate that not all state-based information has a significant impact on perceptions of leader resolve.

**Table 16: Differences in Perceived Resolve among Participants Only Accessing Regime Type Information**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regime Type</th>
<th>Democracy</th>
<th>Non-Democracy</th>
<th>F</th>
<th>n</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Summit Stage</td>
<td>4.275 (0.629)</td>
<td>3.667 (0.983)</td>
<td>1.60</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negotiation Stage</td>
<td>3.083 (1.211)</td>
<td>4.250 (1.252)</td>
<td>3.60</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crisis Stage</td>
<td>4.333 (0.577)</td>
<td>4.400 (0.822)</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

***p < 0.001; **p < 0.01; *p < 0.05
The results of the above analysis show that regime type does not have a significant effect on perceptions of resolve. It is further interesting to note that few participants chose to only access regime type information at an individual stage. This suggests that regime type is not a high priority in participant’s decision-making during the survey. These results are further confirmed when testing for the effects of regime type on perceptions of resolve and controlling for participants who also accessed leader-based information, as presented in Table 17 below.

**Table 17: Differences in Perceived Resolve among Participants Accessing Regime Type and Leader-Based Information**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regime Type</th>
<th>Democracy</th>
<th>Non-Democracy</th>
<th>F</th>
<th>n</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Summit Stage</td>
<td>Mean (sd)</td>
<td>Mean (sd)</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>n</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Summit Stage</td>
<td>3.517 (1.349)</td>
<td>3.756 (1.309)</td>
<td>3.10</td>
<td>384</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negotiation Stage</td>
<td>3.451 (1.211)</td>
<td>3.243 (1.309)</td>
<td>1.14</td>
<td>178</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crisis Stage</td>
<td>3.373 (1.199)</td>
<td>3.171 (1.179)</td>
<td>1.11</td>
<td>154</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

***p < 0.001; **p < 0.01; *p < 0.05

Participants included in this test chose to access both information pertaining to state regime type and some type of leader-specific information at each stage. Once again, regime type does not have a statistically significant effect on perceptions of resolve. It is interesting to note that, like the results from the last set of experiments presented in the previous chapter, there is no clear result as to whether democratic leaders are perceived as more resolute than their non-democratic counterparts. In both this test and the previous test, democratic leaders are viewed as more resolute than non-democratic leaders in some instances, but less resolute in others. Furthermore, there is no consistency regarding during which stage of the survey democratic leaders are viewed as more or less resolute. Using the same robustness test as with the previous state-based and leader-specific information groups, I compare the responses of those participants who accessed
regime type information to those who were eligible to do so but chose not to. In doing so, I continue to find that regime type has little effect on perceptions of resolve. Accessing information that the opposing state was a democracy had no significant effect at the summit (F=0.12; p=0.732), negotiations (F=0.03; p=0.872), or crisis (F=0.63; p=0.428) stages. Similarly, accessing information that the opposing state was not a democracy had no significant effect at the summit (F=0.02; p=0.895), negotiations (F=0.13; p=0.722), or crisis (F=0.01; p=0.937) stages. Overall, the results of these tests indicate state regime type does not significantly affect perceptions of leader resolve.

For the final analysis, I test for the effects of relative military capability on perceptions of resolve. Like the previous analyses, I first analyze the responses of participants who only selected information regarding relative military capability (as presented in Table 18 below) and then examine the responses of participants who accessed information pertaining to both relative military capability and a leader’s statements or behavior (as presented in Table 19 on the next page).

Table 18: Differences in Perceived Resolve among Participants Only Accessing Military Strength Information

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Opposing State's Military Strength</th>
<th>Weaker (Mean, sd)</th>
<th>Equal (Mean, sd)</th>
<th>Stronger (Mean, sd)</th>
<th>F</th>
<th>n</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Summit Stage</td>
<td>3.367 (0.901)</td>
<td>3.375 (0.854)</td>
<td>4.357 (0.476)</td>
<td>4.99*</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negotiation Stage</td>
<td>3.625 (1.575)</td>
<td>3.667 (1.414)</td>
<td>3.964 (1.407)</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crisis Stage</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td>3.618 (1.024)</td>
<td>4.231 (0.927)</td>
<td>2.86</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

***p < 0.001; **p < 0.01; *p < 0.05
As the results in the table above indicate, relative military capability does not have a consistently significant effect on perceptions of resolve. In general, participants who received information that the opposing state’s military was weaker than theirs were more likely to view the opposing leader as less resolute. Conversely, participants who received information that the opposing leader’s military was stronger than theirs were more likely to view the opposing leader as resolute. However, these differences were only statistically significant during the summit stage of the survey. It is also interesting to note that for the crisis stage of the survey, not a single participant assigned to the opposing military weaker condition chose to only access information pertaining to military strength. Of further interest is the finding that leaders from states that have a weaker military or are of comparable military strength are viewed as similar in their resolve.

Based on the results of the last set of experiments presented in the previous chapter, one would expect that leaders from states with comparable military power to the participant’s military would be viewed as more resolute than leader’s from states with a weaker military. Interestingly, the impact of relative military strength on perceptions of resolve changes once participants who also accessed leader-specific information are included in the analysis, as presented in Table 19 below.

**Table 19: Differences in Perceived Resolve among Participants Accessing Military Strength and Leader-Based Information**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Opposing State’s Military Strength</th>
<th>Weaker</th>
<th>Equal</th>
<th>Stronger</th>
<th>$F$</th>
<th>n</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mean (sd)</td>
<td>Mean (sd)</td>
<td>Mean (sd)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Summit Stage</td>
<td>3.313 (1.353)</td>
<td>3.495 (1.299)</td>
<td>3.839 (1.242)</td>
<td>7.94***</td>
<td>576</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negotiation Stage</td>
<td>3.286 (1.250)</td>
<td>3.335 (1.272)</td>
<td>3.374 (1.135)</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>298</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crisis Stage</td>
<td>3.077 (1.128)</td>
<td>3.419 (1.182)</td>
<td>3.519 (1.159)</td>
<td>3.67*</td>
<td>338</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

***$p < 0.001$; **$p < 0.01$; *$p < 0.05$
As the above table shows, military strength does not have a consistently significant effect on perceptions of resolve. While relative military capability has a significant effect on perceptions of resolve during the summit stage and crisis stage, it is not statistically significant during the negotiation stage. This change in the significance of relative military capability once leader-specific information is included in the analysis may suggest that there is an interaction effect between a leader’s statements or behavior and the relative military capability of the leader’s state.

In addition, I conducted robustness tests to determine the baseline effect of accessing information pertaining to military capability at each stage of the survey by comparing the responses of those who accessed military capability information to those who chose not to. The results indicate that military strength has differing effects on perceptions of resolve depending on the opposing state’s relative military capability. Accessing information that the opposing state’s military was weaker had no significant effect at the summit (F=2.11; p=0.148), negotiation (F=0.55; p=0.459), or crisis (F=0.15; p=0.693) stage. In contrast, accessing information that the opposing state’s military was of equal strength to the participant’s military did not have a significant effect at the summit (F=0.02; p=0.878) or negotiation (F=1.42; p=0.234) stages, but did significantly and positively impact perceptions of resolve at the crisis stage (F=3.93; p=0.049).

Finally, accessing information that the opposing state’s military was stronger than the participant’s did not significantly effect on perceptions of resolve at the summit stage (F=3.21; p=0.074), negotiation stage (F=0.96; p=0.328), or crisis stage (F=1.49; p=0.223). As such, the findings on relative state capability are unclear. While there are significant differences in perceptions of resolve when comparing the different levels of military strength, this effect largely
dissipates when the responses of participants accessing this information are compared to those who chose not to access this information. Overall, however, it is clear that relative military capability has a less significant and consistent effect than other state-based variables.

4.5.2 Information Order Choice and Perceptions of Resolve

In Chapter 2, I hypothesize that due to cognitive limitations in the way in which individuals seek out and process information, early assessments of resolve should impact later perceptions of resolve (H₈). This effect is driven by early perceptions being difficult to change, allowing them to carry into future interactions and shape how information is both accessed and processed by individuals. By applying this same logic to the decision-making process of participants throughout the survey, the order of information choice at each stage of the survey can significantly impact participants’ perceptions of resolve at each stage. One of the primary benefits of using process tracing methods is that it allows the researcher to track the decision-making process of the participant. Earlier in this chapter I presented frequency distributions indicating which pieces of information participants accessed first at each stage of the survey. Analyzing these statistics, I inferred that leader-specific information is critical to participants’ decision-making as information order choice is both an important signal of the heuristic decision-making style of participants and an indication of which information is viewed as most important (Lau and Redlawsk 2001). While prior tests indicate that the content of information can affect perceptions of resolve, the results of the ANOVA tests analyzing the impact of information order choice indicate that the order in which information is accessed has little significant effect on perceptions of resolve. Table 20, on the next page, presents the F-scores and significance of accessing a particular piece of information first.
Table 20: The Effect of Accessing Each Piece of Information First on Perceptions of Resolve

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Information Type</th>
<th>Summit Stage</th>
<th>Negotiation Stage</th>
<th>Crisis Stage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Leader Statements</td>
<td>0.97</td>
<td>1.36</td>
<td>0.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intelligence Reports</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-----</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leader Behavior in Previous Stage</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>5.89*</td>
<td>0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Past Leader Behavior in Similar Situations</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>20.20***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State History</td>
<td>0.49</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>3.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State Interest</td>
<td>0.35</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regime Type</td>
<td>2.83</td>
<td>0.31</td>
<td>0.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opposing State’s Military Strength</td>
<td>1.06</td>
<td>5.98*</td>
<td>0.02</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

***p < 0.001; **p < 0.01; *p < 0.05; F-scores reported

As the above table indicates, choosing to access a piece of information first during each stage has little significant effect on participants’ perceptions of resolve at that stage. This may be due to the fact that participants conducted a fairly thorough information search. As previously discussed, participants were highly likely to choose as much or almost as much information as was available to them at the summit stage, and were then as likely to choose one piece of information, two pieces of information, or all available pieces of information at later stages. While it appears that information order choice has little effect on perceptions of resolve at each stage, I next test for the impact of information accessed at early stages on later perceptions of resolve and find that early information is indeed influential to later perceptions of resolve.

4.5.3 The Effect of Early Information and Perceptions on Later Assessments of Resolve

In Chapter 2, I hypothesize that early perceptions of resolve will impact future perceptions as they will be most influential in leaders’ assessments of resolve (H8). Applying this hypothesis to the experimental data predicts that information accessed during early stages of the survey will significantly impact participants’ perceptions of resolve at later stages. This is
particularly true of information accessed during the summit stage as participants have no prior information regarding the characteristics of either the leader or the state. Furthermore, this potential effect of early information influencing later perceptions of resolve may impact the information participants choose to access during later stages of the survey. More specifically, as state-based information is static (although participants are unaware of this), participants may access state-based information during the early stages of the survey and maintain this information in their decision-making process throughout the survey without accessing additional state-based information at later stages. For example, participants may reason that it is unlikely that the military capabilities of a state would change dramatically during the few months that are said to elapse between the summit and negotiation stages, and they may therefore choose not to access this information at the negotiation stage. This may also explain why there is such a dramatic decline in the number of participants accessing state-based information after the summit stage.

To determine the effect of early information on later perceptions of resolve, I first examine the impact of accessing information during the summit stage on participants’ perceptions of the opposing leader’s resolve at the negotiation and crisis stages as well as the effects of accessing information during the negotiation stage on participants’ perceptions of the leader’s resolve during the crisis stage. In Table 21 on the next page, I present the F-Score results of the ANOVA tests assessing the effects of early information on later perceptions of resolve. The results indicate that information accessed early during the survey significantly affects participants’ perceptions of leader resolve at later stages.
Table 21: The Effect of Accessing Information at an Earlier Stage on Perceptions of Resolve at a Later Stage

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Summit Stage Access</th>
<th>Negotiation Stage Access</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Negotiation Resolve</td>
<td>Crisis Resolve</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Leader Statements</strong></td>
<td>740.41***</td>
<td>28.49***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Intelligence Reports</strong></td>
<td>964.89***</td>
<td>39.42***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>State History</strong></td>
<td>6.92**</td>
<td>45.16***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>State Interest</strong></td>
<td>6.98**</td>
<td>11.17***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Regime Type</strong></td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>0.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Opposing State’s Military Strength</strong></td>
<td>0.69</td>
<td>12.14***</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

***p < 0.001; **p < 0.01; *p < 0.05; F-scores reported

In this test, I compared the perceptions of resolve at later stages of the survey across participants who chose to access a specific piece of information (as indicated in the far left column) earlier during the survey to those who could access this information but chose not to. The results above show that both leader-specific and state-based information gathered early during the survey can significantly condition perceptions of resolve during later decision-making. Most notably, a leader’s statements during the summit and negotiation stages significantly impact perceptions of that leader’s resolve during later stages. Similarly, gathering information from intelligence reports as to how the opposing leader may act during the summit significantly conditions the perceptions of leader resolve during both the negotiation and crisis stages. Participants who accessed information that the leader made resolute statements or that the participant’s advisors believed the opposing leader would be resolute during the summit were more likely to perceive the leader as tough and determined during future stages. Similarly, for both state history and state interest information groups, I find that previously accessing this information at an earlier stage has a statistically significant effect on later perceptions of resolve.
Participants who access information that the state stood firm during past summits and negotiations are more likely to view the opposing leader as resolute during the negotiation and crisis stages. Similarly, participants who access information during the summit and negotiation stages that the dispute is a high priority for the opposing state are more likely to view the opposing leader as resolute during subsequent stages. Of particular interest is the prolonged effect of accessing state-based information during the summit stage. For three of the four state-based variables (state history, state interest, and military strength), the content of the information accessed during the first stage has a significant impact on perceptions of resolve during the final stage of the survey. These results indicate that early information can significantly affect perceptions of resolve during later interactions.

In addition, I also examine the perceptions of participants who, during the negotiation and/or crisis stages, chose to access additional information regarding how the leader behaved in the previous stage in order to determine the extent to which a leader’s previous behavior affects perceptions of resolve. The decision to access this information may, in and of itself, be interpreted as an indication that leaders can develop reputations for resolve as these participants access information about the leader’s past to make predictions about the leader’s current and future behavior. I find that additional information regarding the leader’s behavior in the previous stage has a significant effect on perceptions of the leader’s resolve at the current stage. Participants who accessed information during the negotiation stage that the leader behaved resolutely during the summit stage were significantly more likely to perceive the leader as tough and determined during negotiations than those who accessed information that the leader behaved irresolutely during the summit stage (F=974.49; p=0.000). Similarly, participants who accessed information during the crisis stage that the leader behaved resolutely during extended
negotiations were significantly more likely than those who accessed information that the leader behaved irresolutely to believe the leader would be tough and determined during the upcoming crisis ($F=78.72; p=0.000$). These participants were also more likely to believe the leader would stand firm in the face of the potential threat ($F=26.27; p=0.000$). This indicates that information regarding a leader’s behavior in prior interactions matters for assessments of resolve.

Finally, I directly test one of the primary hypotheses of my thesis by examining whether early perceptions of resolve impact on later assessments. I find that early perceptions of resolve significantly condition participants’ assessments of leader resolve at later stages. Most notably, participants who perceived the opposing leader to be more resolute during the summit stage were significantly more likely to perceive the leader to be tough and determined during both the negotiation stage ($F=2.21; p=0.0197$) and crisis stage ($F=12.51; p=0.000$) than participants who perceived the opposing leader as less resolute during the summit stage. Furthermore, I find a similar statistically significant effect regarding perceptions of leader resolve at the negotiation stage on perceptions of resolve at the crisis stage ($F=34.74; p=0.000$). Accordingly, both early pieces of information and early perceptions of resolve can significantly condition later assessments of resolve.

### 4.5.4 Additional Influences on Perceptions of Resolve

The results of this chapter overwhelmingly indicate that participants’ perceptions of a leader’s resolve are based, in large part, on that leader’s statements and behavior as well as key state-based variables, namely state past behavior and communicated interest in the dispute. Furthermore, information accessed during earlier stages can significantly affect perceptions of resolve, as can prior perceptions of a leader’s resolve. In the previous set of experiments presented in the last chapter, I found that additional factors can also influence perceptions of
resolve, including participants’ views on the use of force, their gender, and their political leanings. For the final analysis, I conducted a series of OLS models investigating the effects of additional variables drawn from the control and demographic questions on perceptions of resolve at each stage. The results of these tests are presented in Table 22 below.

**Table 22: Additional Influences on Perceptions of Resolve**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>(1) Resolve During Summit</th>
<th>(2) Resolve During Negotiations</th>
<th>(3) Resolve During Crisis</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Views on Leaders</td>
<td>0.030</td>
<td>-0.022</td>
<td>-0.017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.031)</td>
<td>(0.026)</td>
<td>(0.027)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Views on Force</td>
<td>-0.041</td>
<td>0.023</td>
<td>-0.032</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.035)</td>
<td>(0.030)</td>
<td>(0.031)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Leanings</td>
<td>0.0002</td>
<td>0.024</td>
<td>-0.009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.017)</td>
<td>(0.014)</td>
<td>(0.015)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>0.076</td>
<td>-0.052</td>
<td>0.048</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.049)</td>
<td>(0.042)</td>
<td>(0.044)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attention</td>
<td>-0.021</td>
<td>0.010</td>
<td>0.008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.029)</td>
<td>(0.025)</td>
<td>(0.026)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interest</td>
<td>0.0006</td>
<td>-0.024</td>
<td>-0.016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0277)</td>
<td>(0.024)</td>
<td>(0.024)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Summit Resolve</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.469***</td>
<td>0.039*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.15)</td>
<td>(0.018)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negotiation Resolve</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.251***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.019)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>3.266***</td>
<td>1.681***</td>
<td>2.504***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.198)</td>
<td>(0.175)</td>
<td>(0.185)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations (N)</td>
<td>3060</td>
<td>3060</td>
<td>3060</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$R^2$</td>
<td>0.0019</td>
<td>0.2346</td>
<td>0.0832</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

***$p < 0.001$; **$p < 0.01$; *$p < 0.05$
Each model assesses the impact of these variables on participants’ perceptions of leader resolve at the summit, negotiation, and crisis stages respectively. The results of these models clearly indicate that the demographics of participants do not have a significant effect on perceptions of resolve at each stage. Regarding the control questions, neither views on the use of force nor the importance of leaders significantly affect perceptions of resolve. In contrast, the perceived resolve of the leader during previous stages does have an impact on perceptions of resolve at the current stage. Perceived resolve during the summit is positively and significantly related to perceptions of resolve at both the negotiation and crisis stages, as are perceptions of resolve during the negotiation stage on perceptions of resolve at the crisis stage. These results confirm the findings from previous tests presented in the last section indicating that early perceptions of resolve can carry far into the future.

4.6 Conclusions: The Development of Leader Resolve

The results of this second set of experiments provide strong support for my primary hypotheses regarding both the ability of leaders to develop reputations for resolve as well as the way in which these reputations change over time. To begin, it is clear from my analysis that leader-specific information is highly salient to participants’ decision-making processes and that participants prioritize this information over other information. Frequency statistics reveal that participants seek out leader-based information at higher rates than state-based information and are more likely to seek out leader-based information first. In this regard, participants more highly value a leader’s past behavior, either in similar situations or in previous stages, than a leader’s statements or state-based characteristics.

Further tests confirm the significance of a leader’s past actions on perceptions of resolve. Information regarding a leader’s past actions in similar situations is not only highly valued by
participants, but also has a significant effect on perceptions of resolve. So too does additional information regarding how the leader acted in the previous stage of the survey. Interestingly, while a leader’s statements are less highly valued by participants when compared to that leader’s actions, a leader’s statements also have a statistically significant effect on perceptions of resolve. Reputation is not just built upon a leader’s actions. Rather, a leader’s statements can also help to communicate resolve. While actions are influential to perceptions of resolve, statements may help signal resolve by clarifying a leader’s intentions during disputes. This result carries important implications for policy-makers. While I address these implications more fully in the concluding chapter, this finding most prominently reveals that policy makers should be aware that resolute or irresolute statements can be meaningful. Leaders must realize that both their statements and behavior contribute to their reputations for resolve. Furthermore, it is not just actions during international crises that matter; rather, both a leader’s statements and behavior during earlier interactions can influence perceptions of resolve. Accordingly, both statements and behavior contribute to reputations for resolve, providing leaders numerous avenues by which to signal and communicate their intentions during disputes.

In addition to a leader’s statements and behavior, state-based variables can also have a significant impact on perceptions of resolve. Like the previous set of experiments, I find that state history and communicated interest in the dispute are particularly important for perceptions of resolve. While a state history of irresolute action can harm perceptions of a leader’s resolve, a state history of resolute action can bolster that leader’s reputation. Conversely, communicating that an issue is not a top priority for the state can be particularly harmful to a leader’s reputation for resolve. In this set of experiments, I find mixed evidence regarding the impact of relative military capability on perceptions of resolve. Finally, regime type had no significant effect on
perceptions of resolve, and it remains unclear as to whether democratic or non-democratic leaders were perceived as more resolute in principle.

The results of this set of experiments also provide critical insight into the ways in which reputation for resolve develops over time for a single leader. In Chapter 2, I theorized that reputations for resolve will develop early on and that these initial perceptions of resolve will be difficult to change. Indeed, I found that early perceptions of resolve were highly influential at later stages of the survey. Furthermore, information accessed during earlier stages of the survey remained a significant influence on perceptions of resolve at later stages. This is particularly true of a leader’s statements and actions as well as the state’s history and communicated interest in the dispute. The results of the experiments discussed in this chapter provide critical insight into the ways in which leader reputation for resolve develops over time. I find that early perceptions of resolve are highly influential to later assessments of leader resolve. Furthermore, individual pieces of information accessed during earlier stages of the survey remain significant influences on perceptions of resolve at later stages. This is particularly true of a leader’s statements and actions as well as the state’s history and communicated interest in the dispute. This finding has significant implications for policy makers, who need to be aware that their statements and actions early during disputes or in the early stages of their tenure can be highly influential to the development of their reputations for resolve. Policy makers would be served well by clearly communicating their resolve through both their statements and actions during early negotiations and disputes.

In the next chapter, I further examine the effect of these leader-specific versus state-based factors on reputations for resolve through a large-N statistical study. More specifically, I address

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10 This hypothesis will be further tested in Chapter 6 where I follow the development of American Presidents Eisenhower’s and Kennedy’s reputations for resolve over time vis-à-vis Soviet Premier Khrushchev. In addition, this case study further delineates the effects of a leader’s statements versus behavior on reputations for resolve.
the impact of a leader’s behavior on the onset of future crises and delve more fully into the extent to which state-based factors are influential in this regard. I particularly focus on the potential dichotomy between leader behavior and state behavior and the effect these two factors have on reputations for resolve and build upon the findings of the two experimental chapters. The results of these experiments confirm that leaders can develop reputations and illustrate how individual leaders develop these reputations for resolve over time. Not only is a leader’s behavior central to the development of these reputations, but a leader’s statements are also critical to the development of his/her reputation within the experiment. Looking forward, scholars should more fully examine the impact of leader behavior international phenomenon. Within the study of reputation, scholars should explore the impacts of leader reputation on international conflict and also consider other conditions under which leaders can develop these reputations. Even more so, my study highlights the importance of observing how leader behavior is interpreted by outside observers. Taken in conjunction with the previous set of experiments discussed in Chapter 3, the results of these two sets of experiments clearly indicate that individual leaders can develop reputations for resolve independently of both their predecessors and the state, and that both a leaders statements and behavior are critical to the communication of resolve.
Works Cited:


Appendix A:

Included in this appendix are the hypotheses, as presented in Chapter 2 of my dissertation, derived from my Leader Interaction Theory of Reputation development as well as alternative hypothesis from the extant literature.

Table 23: Hypotheses from Leaders, Perceptions, and Reputations for Resolve

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hypotheses Derived from My Leader Interaction Theory of Reputation Development</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$H_1$  $Leader \ Action \ and \ Statements$: Individual leaders will develop reputations for resolve independently of the state. These perceptions of resolve will be based on the current leader’s communicated resolve through his statements and actions while in office.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$H_8$  $Importance \ of \ Early \ Actions$: Once a leader’s reputation for resolve has formed, it will be difficult to change. Accordingly, early interactions are critical to the development of a leader’s reputation for resolve.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$H_9$  $Interaction \ of \ Interest \ and \ Behavior \ (H_9)$: The target’s communicated level of interest in an issue will influence the development of a reputation for resolve. Issues that are communicated to be of great strategic importance to the target will carry more weight in the view of the challenger, and the target’s behavior during these disputes will be particularly influential to resolve.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Alternative Hypotheses Derived from the Extant Literature</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$H_2$  $State-Based \ Reputation$: Reputations for resolve will be attributed to states, not leaders. These state reputations for resolve will be based on the past actions of that state.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$H_3$  $Importance \ of \ Resolute \ Behavior$: A target can only gain a reputation for being resolute and cannot gain a reputation for being irresolute.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$H_4$  $Reputation \ Change$: Reputations cannot be reinforced, only changed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$H_5$  $State \ Interest$: Reputations for resolve will be based on communicated state interest over an issue under dispute.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$H_6$  $Relative \ Military \ Capability$: Target states with a relatively stronger military will be viewed as more resolute, while states with a relatively weaker military will be perceived as less resolute.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$H_7$  $Regime \ Type$: Democratic leaders will be perceived as more resolute than non-democratic leaders.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix B:

This appendix supplements the experiments presented in Chapters 4 of *Leaders, Perceptions, and Reputations for Resolve*. This appendix contains the full text of the experimental survey taken by participants in the Amazon Mechanical Turk sample pool. The final amended version of this experiment was approved by the Duke Internal Review Board (protocol B0544; expired on 2/11/2014). The experiment begins with an informed consent form and choosing to continue with the survey serves as participants’ consent to participate. The consent form for the second set of experiments is presented in Figure 27 below.

Thank you for your interest in participating in this research. Please read the following information before continuing.

**What you will be asked to do:** Read a scenario and answer questions based on what you have read.

**Rights:** The decision of whether or not to participate in any portion of this study is completely up to you.

**Benefits and Risks:** There are no direct benefits or any anticipated risks associated with your involvement in this study.

**Compensation:** If you qualify and participate in this study, you will receive a payment of $0.65 for 10-15 minutes of participation. There will be an opportunity to receive an additional $0.10 during the study.

**Confidentiality:** Your responses to all survey questions are completely confidential. You will be asked for your Amazon Mechanical Turk Worker ID at the end of the study so we can make sure you get proper credit for completing the survey.

By clicking on the NEXT button and completing this survey, I give my consent to participate in this study.

Please click the NEXT button below to begin the 10-15 minute survey.

*Figure 27: Experiment 2 Consent Form*

On the next page of the survey, participants are asked to answer a series of demographic and control questions as follows:

**Q1. How interested are you in international politics?**
- Extremely interested
- Somewhat interested
- Neither interested/nor disinterested
- Somewhat uninterested
- Extremely uninterested

**Q2. How closely do you follow international events?**
- Very closely
- Somewhat closely
- Not very closely
- I don’t follow international events at all.
Q3. What is your primary source of information for international politics and events?
   Online news sources
   Blogs
   Television
   Friends and family
   Newspapers
   I do not follow international politics.

Q4. In the past week, how often would you say you paid attention to the news?
   Several times a day
   Once a day
   3-5 times a week
   Once a week
   Once a month
   Not at all

Q5. Generally speaking, do you think of yourself as a...
   Republican
   Democrat
   Independent
   No preference
   Other - please specify

Q6. Generally speaking, do you think of yourself as a....
   Extremely Conservative
   Conservative
   Slightly Conservative
   Moderate; Middle of the Road
   Slightly Liberal
   Liberal
   Extremely Liberal
   Don’t Know, I haven’t thought about it much.

Please tell us how much you agree with the following statements:

Q7. It doesn’t really matter who is in office. A country would end up with the same policies regardless.
   Agree strongly
   Agree
   Neither agree nor disagree
   Disagree
   Disagree strongly

Q8. International leaders are important and have a large impact on international events.
   Agree strongly
   Agree
   Neither agree nor disagree
   Disagree
   Disagree strongly

Q9. The use of military force only makes problems worse.
   Agree strongly
Q10. States should be able to talk things out and reach a peaceful solution to their problems.

Agree strongly
Agree
Neither agree nor disagree
Disagree
Disagree strongly

Q11. Sometimes the only way to solve a problem between states is through military force.

Agree strongly
Agree
Neither agree nor disagree
Disagree
Disagree strongly

Upon answering these questions, participants are presented with the first scenario:

In the next section, you will read a series of scenarios and will be asked to answer questions and make assessments based on what you read. You will be able to access information to help you make these assessments. If your assessments are correct, you will receive a bonus payment of $0.10 in addition to your base payment of $0.65. However, each piece of information you click on will cost you $0.01 from your bonus. This will not be deducted from your base payment of $0.65. Please take your time in reading the scenarios and answer the questions as best you can.

You are the leader of a state that shares a disputed border with a neighboring state. You are about to enter into negotiations at an international summit with the leader of the neighboring state over who should control this disputed area of land along your shared border. This area of land is rich in mineral resources and whoever controls this land will get both more power and resources. Before you go to this important conference to negotiate with the opposing leader, you need to gather information as to how you think this leader will act during the summit meeting. You have never negotiated with this leader before.

On the next screen, you will find pieces of information that your advisors can gather to help you predict how the opposing leader may act during the summit. Please click on the pieces of information you would like to look at. Remember that each piece of information you access will cost you $0.01. After one minute, you will be asked to predict how the opposing leader will act during the summit.
Participants are then asked to select which information they wish to view. The information options for each stage of the survey can be found in Appendix C. Participants are then presented with the following questions:

Q12. During the summit, how likely do you think this leader is to be determined to strongly present in his position at the summit?
   - Very Unlikely
   - Unlikely
   - Neutral
   - Likely
   - Very Likely

Q13. During the summit, how tough or weak do you think this leader will be during negotiations?
   - Very Tough
   - Tough
   - Neutral
   - Weak
   - Very Weak

Q14. How likely do you think it is a compromise will be reached during the summit?
   - Very likely
   - Likely
   - Neutral
   - Unlikely
   - Very Unlikely

Participants are then informed of how the opposing leader acted during the summit, based on the group to which they are assigned, and asked to make further assessments about the leader’s future resolve:

During the summit, you were unable to reach a compromise with the opposing leader as to who should control the disputed area of land. Throughout the summit, this leader [wavered in his position. He did not appear very confident and presented himself weakly during negotiations. Unfortunately, the summit ended before a compromise could be reached.][was unwavering in his position on the border dispute. He was very confident in his position and presented himself strongly during negotiations. It was clear that a compromise would not be reached.]

Q15. How tough or weak do you think this leader will be in future negotiations?
   - Very Tough
   - Tough
   - Neutral
   - Weak
   - Very Weak
Q16. How likely to you think this leader will be determined to strongly present his state's position in future negotiations?
    Very Unlikely
    Unlikely
    Neutral
    Likely
    Very Likely

Participants are then presented with the second scenario and asked to choose which information they would like to access. The full information options available to participants according to their condition and group can be found in Appendix C. The second scenario is presented below:

Since the summit ended a few months ago, you have decided to enter into ongoing negotiations to try to find a solution to the dispute over who should control the disputed area of land. Before you enter into these negotiations you need to predict how the opposing leader will act during these negotiations.

On the next screen, you will find pieces of information that your advisors can gather to help you predict how the opposing leader may act during these negotiations. Please click on the pieces of information you would like to look at. Remember that each piece of information you access will cost you $0.01. After one minute, you will be asked to predict how the opposing leader will act during these negotiations.

Upon accessing information, participants are then asked to answer the following questions:

Q17. During negotiations, how likely do you think this leader is to be determined to strongly present in his position?
    Very Unlikely
    Unlikely
    Neutral
    Likely
    Very Likely

Q18. During the summit, how tough or weak do you think this leader will be during negotiations?
    Very Tough
    Tough
    Neutral
    Weak
    Very Weak

Q19. How likely you do you think it is a compromise will be reached during these negotiations?
    Very likely
    Likely
    Neutral
    Unlikely
    Very Unlikely
As the final part of this stage of the survey, participants are informed as to how the leader acted during negotiations and are asked to predict how the leader would act during future negotiations:

It has been several months, and the negotiations over who should control the area of land continue. Throughout the negotiations, [the opposing leader has indicated he would be willing to compromise to reach a negotiated settlement.][the opposing leader has stood firm in his position.]

Q20. How tough or weak do you think this leader will be in future negotiations?
   Very Tough
   Tough
   Neutral
   Weak
   Very Weak

Q21. How likely to you think this leader will be determined to strongly present his state's position in future negotiations?
   Very Unlikely
   Unlikely
   Neutral
   Likely
   Very Likely

Participants are then presented with the final stage of the scenario and choose to access which information they wish to see. This information can be found in Appendix C. The final scenario is as follows:

Despite the continued negotiations over the disputed piece of land, a compromise has not been reached. You are getting impatient to end the dispute. You can issue a threat to send military forces to the border if a settlement is not reached within the next few months. Before you issue a threat, however, you must predict how the opposing leader would respond to the threat. On the next screen, you will find pieces of information that your advisors can gather to help you predict how the opposing leader may respond to this threat. Please click on the pieces of information you would like to look at. Remember that each piece of information you access will cost you $0.01. After one minute, you will be asked to predict how the opposing leader will respond to the threat.

Participants are then asked to answer the following questions:

Q22. How likely do you think this leader is to be determined to have a strong response to the threat?
   Very Unlikely
   Unlikely
   Neutral
   Likely
Very Likely

Q23. How tough or weak do you think this leader will be in response to this threat?
Very Tough
Tough
Neutral
Weak
Very Weak

Q24. How do you think this leader would respond to your threat?
Back down and agree to a settlement
Stand firm and continue negotiations
Escalate the conflict by sending military forces to the area

Q25. How confident are you in this belief?
Very unconfident
Unconfident
Confident
Very Confident

Q26. Given how you believe this leader will react, would you issue the threat?
No
Yes

As the final part of the last scenario, participants are asked to assess the leader’s resolve in future crises:

Your advisors convinced you not issue the threat at this time and to continue negotiations instead. If you had issued the threat, [the opposing leader would have backed down and agreed to a settlement.] [the opposing leader would have stood firm, and the crisis may have escalated further.]

Q27. How tough or weak do you think this leader will be in future crises?
Very Tough
Tough
Neutral
Weak
Very Weak

Q28. How likely to you think this leader will be determined to strongly present his state's position in future crises?
Very Unlikely
Unlikely
Neutral
Likely
Very Likely

Participants in the experiment are then asked to answer a final series of demographic questions as follows:

Q29. In what year were your born?
Q30. Please indicate your gender:
   Male
   Female
Q31. Please indicate the highest level of study you have achieved:
   Grade school or some high school
   High school diploma
   Some college
   Associates degree
   Bachelors degree
   Masters or Professional degree (MA, MBA, JD)
   Doctorate (Ph.D., MD)

After answering these final questions participants are presented with the following debriefing information and complete the survey:

Thank you for participating in this study. The purpose of this study was to examine how different factors affect your prediction of how a state will react in a crisis. The overall purpose of this study is to add to our knowledge about how leaders and states can develop reputations for resolve. There was one piece of deception in this study. Regardless of the prediction you made about how the opposing state would respond to your threat, you still received the additional payment. This was meant to mimic decision making in the real world where there is strong motivation to correctly perceive the adversary’s resolve in international politics. Thank you again for your participation. Please do not share the details of this survey with other participants.

The entire survey procedure took approximately 8-10 minutes to complete.
Appendix C:

This appendix supplements the set of experiments presented in Chapter 4 and provides additional information to the survey design presented in the previous appendix. This appendix contains three tables reporting the exact wording for each piece of information participants may access at each stage of the survey. The title of the information, as indicated in italics, is the same as participants would see when choosing which information to access. The text following the italics, in each table below, presents the information that would be presented to participants, based on the condition to which they are assigned, who chose to click on that piece of information.

**Table 24: Summit Stage Information Options**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Intelligence Reports About the Opposing Leader:</th>
<th>Your advisors indicate that the leader is indecisive about his state's position and may be not be firm in his demands./Your advisors indicate that the opposing leader will be a tough negotiator and will most likely be very firm in his positions.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Opposing Leader’s Press Statements About the Upcoming Summit:</td>
<td>In a press conference and speech last month, this leader seemed unconfident about the summit and shared his hope that a compromise can be reached quickly during the summit./In a press conference and speech last month, this leader promised that he would be tough during the summit and make sure that his state's position is heard.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State Action During Previous Summits:</td>
<td>In the past this state has been weak and indecisive during summit negotiations and tends to be very willing to compromise./In the past, this state has been tough and wavering in its position during summit negotiations. This state tends to stand firm in its demands during these conferences.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Priority of the Summit to the Opposing Leader:</td>
<td>In press statements, the opposing leader has stated that the disputed border is a high priority for his state./In press statements, the opposing leader has indicated the disputed border may not be his state's top priority.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opposing State’s Form of Government:</td>
<td>The opposing state is a democracy./The opposing state is not a democracy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opposing State’s Military Strength:</td>
<td>The opposing state's military is stronger than your military./The opposing state's military is weaker than your military./The opposing state's military is of equal strength to your military.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Table 25: Negotiation Stage Information Options

**Opposing Leader Press Statements about Negotiations:** In a speech this month this leader said he wanted to quickly reach a compromise and seemed to waver in his position. In a speech this month, this leader said that, while he would like to reach a compromise, he would continue to be tough and strong during negotiations.

**Opposing Leader Actions with Other Leaders:** In negotiations with other leaders, this leader has been weak in asserting his demands and is often very willing to compromise. In negotiations with other leaders, this leader has been strong and unwavering in making sure his state's positions are heard.

**Additional Leader Summit Behavior Information:** Your advisors believe the opposing leader was quite weak during the summit negotiations. They suggest that in the future he may continue to act passively. Throughout the summit, the leader seemed to be unsure of his position. Your advisors believe the opposing leader was very strong during the summit negotiations. They suggest that in the future he may continue to act assertively. Throughout the summit, the leader was firm in his positions.

**State Action During Previous Negotiations:** In the past, this state has been less tough and more indecisive during similar negotiations. During negotiations, this state tends to be very willing to compromise. In the past, this state has been tough and unwavering during similar negotiations. During negotiations, this state tends to stand firm in its demands.

**Priority of Negotiations to the Opposing State:** The opposing leader has repeatedly stated that the disputed border is the top priority for his state right now. You advisors believe the opposing state will take negotiations very seriously. The opposing leader has repeatedly indicated that the disputed border is not a top priority for his state right now. You advisors believe the opposing state may not negotiations as seriously.

**More Information on Opposing State's Government Type:** As the opposing state is a democracy, the opposing leader was elected by the people. As the opposing state is not a democracy, the opposing leader came to office by taking power. He was not democratically elected.

**More Information on Opposing State’s Military:** The opposing state's military is stronger than your military. They have both more troops and weapons than your military. The opposing state's military is weaker than your military. They do not have as many troops or weapons as your military. The opposing state's military is comparable in strength to your military. You have roughly the same amount of both troops and weapons.
### Table 26: Crisis Stage Information Options

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Topic</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Opposing Leader Press Statements about Crisis</strong></td>
<td>In a press conference last month, this leader said he would like to avoid further conflict over the disputed area./In a press conference last month, this leader warned that he would not be intimidated into a compromise if he felt the terms of a settlement were unacceptable.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Opposing Leader Response to Previous Threats</strong></td>
<td>In the past, this leader has been willing to back down when threatened by other leaders./In the past, this leader has stood firm in the face of threats from other leaders.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Additional Leader Negotiation Behavior Information</strong></td>
<td>Throughout the negotiations, the opposing leader has appeared unsure of his position and has, at times, been unclear in his demands./Throughout the negotiations, the opposing leader has presented his position strongly and has not wavered in his demands.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>State Response to Past Threats</strong></td>
<td>In the past, this state has backed down when threatened by other states./In the past, this state has stood firm and acted tough when threatened by other states.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Priority of the Dispute to the Opposing State</strong></td>
<td>The disputed area remains a high priority for the opposing state./While the other state would like to control the disputed border, it is clear that there are other foreign policy issues that are of a higher priority right now.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>More Information on Opposing State's Government Type</strong></td>
<td>As the opposing state is a democracy, the opposing leader was elected by the people./As the opposing state is not a democracy, the opposing leader came to office by taking power. He was not democratically elected.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>More Information on Opposing State’s Military</strong></td>
<td>The opposing state's military is stronger than your military. Their troops are better trained than yours./The opposing state's military is weaker than your military. Their troops are not as well trained as your troops./The opposing state's military is equal in strength to your military. Both your troops and their troops are equally well trained.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>